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ABSTRACT 
Managers in large organizations may manipulate earnings reports to suit their desire at the 
detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders. This may threaten the continuous survival 
of the organizations. To protect their interest shareholders through the board mandate audit 
committee to monitor the financial reporting process. The objective of this study is to examine 
a relationship between audit committee and external audit characteristics and earnings 
management in Nigeria. The study also investigates the moderating role of foreign ownership 
on the relationship between audit committee and external audit characteristics and earnings 
management. In addition, it also investigates the extent of earnings management before and 
after the revision of the code of corporate governance. Secondary data is collected for a sample 
of 93 nonfinancial public companies listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for the 
period of 2009-2014. This study conducts multiple linear regressions using pooled OLS. 
Earnings management is measured by the level of discretionary accruals using modified Jones 
model (1995). Audit committee and external audit characteristics are discussed from the 
perspective of agency theory and resource dependence theory. The study finds that the size 
and independence of audit committee and external auditors’ type are negatively related to 
earnings management before and after the moderation; audit committee overlapping positively 
affects earnings management before and after the moderation; while external auditors’ 
independence and female director in audit committee positively affect earnings management 
prior to moderation; audit committee meeting is negatively related to earnings management 
only after the moderation. The study also finds higher earnings management prior to the 
revision of corporate governance code. This study recommends further policies that will 
increase foreign ownership in firms because it enhances corporate governance mechanisms 
and boosts the economy of the country.   
Keywords: earnings management, corporate governance, audit committee characteristics, 
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ABSTRAK 
Pengurus dalam organisasi besar boleh memanipulasi laporan pendapatan untuk memenuhi  
hasrat  merugikan para pemegang saham dan pihak berkepentingan lain. Hal ini mungkin 
mengancam keterusan survival sesebuah organisasi. Untuk melindungi kepentingan 
pemegang saham melalui mandat lembaga, jawatankuasa audit memantau proses pelaporan 
kewangan. Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidik hubungan di antara jawatankuasa audit 
dan ciri-ciri audit luaran dengan pengurusan pendapatan di Nigeria. Kajian ini juga menyelidik 
peranan pemilikan asing yang mengantarakan hubungan di antara jawatankuasa audit dan ciri-
ciri audit luaran dengan pengurusan pendapatan. Di samping itu, kajian ini turut meninjau 
sejauh mana pengurusan pendapatan sebelum dan selepas semakan kod tadbir urus korporat. 
Data sekunder dikumpulkan bagi sampel  93 buah syarikat awam bukan kewangan yang 
disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Nigeria (NSE) untuk tempoh 2009-2014. Kajian ini 
mengendalikan pelbagai regresi linear menggunakan OLS yang disatukan. Pengurusan 
pendapatan diukur dengan tahap akruan budi bicara menggunakan model Jones yang 
diubahsuai (1995). Jawatankuasa audit dan ciri-ciri audit luaran dibincangkan dari perspektif 
teori agensi dan teori pergantungan sumber. Kajian mendapati bahawa saiz dan kebebasan 
jawatankuasa audit serta jenis juruaudit luaran mempunyai kaitan negatif dengan pengurusan 
pendapatan sebelum dan selepas pengantaraan; Jawatankuasa audit bertindih secara positif 
mempengaruhi pengurusan pendapatan sebelum dan selepas pengantaraan; Sementara 
kebebasan juruaudit luar dan pengarah wanita dalam jawatankuasa audit positif 
mempengaruhi pengurusan pendapatan sebelum pengantaraan; Mesyuarat jawatankuasa audit 
pula  berkait dengan pengurusan pendapatan hanya selepas pengantaraan. Kajian ini juga 
mendapati pengurusan pendapatan yang lebih tinggi sebelum semakan semula kod tadbir urus 
korporat. Oleh itu, kajian ini mencadangkan dasar lanjutan yang akan meningkatkan 
pemilikan asing di firma kerana hal ini meningkatkan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dan 
meningkatkan ekonomi negara. 
Kata kunci: pengurusan pendapatan, tadbir urus korporat, ciri jawatankuasa audit, ciri audit 
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 Background of the Study  
Management uses financial reporting and disclosure  to convey firm performance and its 
governance to the shareholders and other stakeholders such as debt-holders, rating agencies 
and regulators (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The disclosure is done via regulated financial 
reports, which comprise of financial statements, management discussions or analysis, notes 
to the accounts as well as regulatory filings. 
However, for the managers to effectively communicate firm performance, they must be 
allowed some level of freedom to exercise best judgment in the process of financial 
reporting, because they understand the firm better (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). In exercising 
the judgment, managers sometimes are motivated to choose reporting methods and 
estimates that suit their interest not the interest of the shareholders by managing earnings  
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The conflict of interest mostly arise in a typical large 
corporations where ownership and control are separated (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
genesis of the conflicting interests between management and shareholders is the central 
idea of the agency theory. This theory explained opportunistic tendency of management 
that made them to manage earnings. Agency relationship is “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
his behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. When 
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